The paper considers Keynes's major contributions before The General Theory, namely A Tract on Monetary Reform and A Treatise on Money, and shows that they were close to the views which Friedman would later develop. However, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money represented a major challenge to the orthodoxy of the time, and it was to this that Friedman radically objected. We identify the main areas in which Keynes departed from the mainstream theory of the time, and show how Friedman attempted to undermine each of Keynes's major contributions and the extent to which he was successful. Friedman regarded Keynes's contributions as detrimental to, and a definitive step backward for, the economics profession.
"Until I reread my statement to Congress [on the size of the increase in taxation needed to prevent inflation] I had completely forgotten how thoroughly Keynesian I then was. I was apparently cured, or some would say corrupted, shortly after the end of the war." (Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman 1988: 113) .
Friedman returned to Chicago in 1946, with an ideological blueprint mapping a defined strategy to impede and reverse any shift to Keynesianism that might appear within the Faculty. This objective would entail shaping some appropriate cudgels with which to discredit unsound Faculty appointments, as well as any insidious encroachments from the Cowles Commission. The subsequent ideological gilding was noticed by to Jacob Viner, hardly a convert to Keynesian positions or a supporter of the latest fads, upon a return visit in 1951.
It was not until after I left Chicago in 1946 that I began to hear rumors about a 'Chicago School' which was engaged in organized battle for laissez faire and "quantity theory of money' against 'imperfect competition' theorizing and 'Keynesianism'. I remained sceptical about this until I attended a conference sponsored by University of Chicago professors in 1951. The invited participants were a varied lot of academics, bureaucrats, businessmen, etc., but the program for discussion, the selection of chairmen, and everything about the participants were so patently rigidly structured, so loaded, that I got more amusement from the conference than from any other I ever attended. Even the source of the financing of the Conference, as I found out later, was ideologically loaded (Jacob Viner quoted in Patinkin 2003b:112). But to understand the full extent of the dynamics in part driving Friedman, the disparity in the concept of classical liberalism as understood by these two dominant economists is key. Robert Skidelsky aptly categorised Keynes as being "the last of the great English Liberals", (Skidelsky 1992: xv.) . Friedman, of course, maintained his identity as a classical liberal as a core component of his public persona, influence, as were many other American liberals, by the thoughts of Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville. Keynes was similarly influenced by Burke, even though Burke politically was a Tory 5 .
However, Friedman and Keynes had distinctly different conceptions of what it meant to be a liberal. To quote Friedman:
"As liberals we take freedom of the individual, or perhaps the family, as our ultimate goal in judging social arrangements. Freedom as a value in this sense has to do with the interrelations among people; It has no meaning whatsoever to Robinson Crusoe on an isolated island (without his Man Friday). Robinson Crusoe on his island is subject to 'constraints', he has a limited number of alternatives, but there is no problem of freedom in the sense that is relevant to our discussion. " (2002: 12) In contrast, Keynes took issue with such a fundamentalist position:
"In my opinion there is now no place, except in the left wing of the Conservative Party, for those whose hearts are set on old-fashioned individualism and laissez-faire in all their rigourgreatly though these contributed to the success of the nineteenth century. I say this, not because I think that these doctrines were wrong in the conditions which gave birth to them … but because they have ceased to be applicable to modern conditions. Our [the Liberal Party's]
programme must deal not with the historic issues of Liberalism, but with those matterswhether or not they have already become party questions-which are of living interest and urgent importance to-day. " (1925: 300-301) Keynes clearly considered economic and political issues to be inextricably intertwined. For his part, Friedman failed to make such a connection publicly explicit. However, at the end of his preface to the 2002 edition of Capitalism and Freedom, he moved one small step towards this in his admission that "the one major defect in the book seems to me an inadequate 5 In certain key aspects, Keynes was much closer to the classical liberal economists, and to his teacher Alfred Marshall, than Friedman. Keynes was not doctrinaire, so that, in the same spirit that enlivened John Stuart Mill, he was open to alternative views. In fact, he cultivated a notorious reputation for changing his mind. 'When someone persuades me that I am wrong, I change my mind. What do you do?' (This statement is widely attributed to Keynes though the exact reference is disputed. Biographers such as Skidelsky and Moggridge have both been unable to locate it. Keynes did write, 'Yet the orientation of my mind is changed; and I share this change of mind with many others' (Keynes 1933:755) ).Friedman and his allies at Chicago were not given to changing positions, perhaps adopting this approach as something of a tactical marketing strategy. As Samuelson put it 'I think Milton quietly changed, he just quietly dropped that [100% reverse ratio in banking]. He doesn't particularly announce changes in positions, but instead, lets them just decay away' (Conversation between Craig Freedman and Paul Samuelson, November 1997).
treatment of the role of political freedom, which under some circumstances promotes economic and civil freedom, and in others inhibits economic and civil freedom" (ix-x). and it was to this that Friedman radically objected. In section 3 we identify the main areas in which Keynes departed from the mainstream theory of the time. The rest of the chapter shows how Friedman attempted to undermine each of Keynes's major contributions and the extent to which he was successful.
Keynes as a Minor Quantity Theorist
The problem for Friedman was to establish a plausible linkage with pre-Keynesian orthodoxy.
The solution to this problem was found along two lines. The first was the invention of a University of Chicago oral tradition that was alleged to have preserved understanding of the fundamental truth among a small band of the initiated through the dark years of the Keynesian despotism. The second was a careful combing of the obiter dicta of the great neo-classical quantity theorists for any bits of evidence that showed recognition (or could be interpreted to show recognition) of the fact that the decision to hold money involves a choice between holding money and holding wealth in other forms, and is conditioned by the rates of return available on other assets (Johnson 2003:170 (Keynes 1923 , C.W., IV, 1971 Our conclusions up to this point are, therefore, that, when stability of the internal price level and stability of the external exchanges are incompatible, the former is generally preferable; and that on occasions when the dilemma is acute, the preservation of the former at the expense of the latter is, fortunately perhaps, the line of least resistance (Keynes 1923: 132) .
A major reason for this aim, which would certainly have appealed to Friedman, was that a stable and constant internal price level would better allow the relative price system to achieve its fundamental allocative role without needing to read its signals through the obscuring camouflage of an overall price level given to continuous change. In addition, this approach avoided arbitrary and damaging redistributions between creditors and debtors with regard to both income and wealth. Keynes analysed these effects with both insight and persuasive conviction in a manner sympathetic to the approach later pioneered by Friedman 8 .
Keynes at that stage was a supporter of free trade and of competitive markets generally. His greatest departure from Marshall was a shift in emphasis from the long-period position of Book V of Marshall's Principles (also a favourite of Friedman's) 9 to a much greater emphasis on short-run changes in the processes at work in the economy. His focus concentrated on those policies that could tackle malfunctions associated with such processes. This is confirmed most strikingly in the paragraph containing Keynes best-known aphorism: "In the long run we are all dead", Keynes 1923 , IV, 1971 Thanks to Wicksell, we are all acquainted with the concept of a "natural" rate of interest and the possibility of a discrepancy between the "natural" and the "market" rate. …. This analysis has its close counterpart in the employment market. At any moment of time, there is some level of unemployment which has the property that it is consistent with equilibrium in the structure of real wage rates. ….. . A lower level of unemployment is an indication that there is an excess demand for labor that will produce upward pressure on real wage rates. A higher level of unemployment is an indication that there is an excess supply of labor that will produce downward pressure on real wage rates. The "natural rate of unemployment," in other words, is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and Friedman 1956.) supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on. (Friedman 1968:7- I have had in mind the idea that a computer would produce, for example, a constant rate of growth in the quantity of money as defined, let us say, by M2, something like 3% to5% per year. There are certainly occasions in which discretionary changes in policy guided by a wise and talented manager of monetary policy would do better than the fixed rate, but they would be rare. In any event, the computer program would certainly prevent any major disasters either way, any major inflation or any major depressions.
One of the great defects of our kind of monetary system is that its performance depends so much on the quality of the people who are put in charge. We have seen that in the history of our own Federal Reserve System. Surely a computer would have produced far better results during the 1930s and during both world wars (Varadarajan Jan.22, 2007) .
Friedman was admittedly not as extreme as Stigler in ascribing every regulatory initiative and application to narrow self-interest. He reasonably made some allowance for publicly spirited bureaucrats and even politicians. Universal venality need not rule. However, he the perils of the type of government intervention prescribed by Keynes could not, and should not, be ignored.
.
A Treatise on Money (1930) was meant to be Keynes's magnum opus, to establish him as the profession's leading monetary economist by publishing a Teutonic-style tome. Keynes was to tell his parents in September 1930 when the book was released, that artistically, it was a failure because he had changed his mind "too much" during its gestation period. It was still Marshallian in construction. The volume continued to emphasise the characteristics of the long-period position placed within a quantity theory of money framework. The greatest originality, he argued, was to be found in the dynamic, out-of-equilibrium analysis of the processes occurring between one long-period position and another when one or more of the fundamental determinants of the position had changed. "My object has been to find a method which is useful in describing, not merely the characteristics of static equilibrium, but also those of disequilibrium, and to discover the dynamical laws governing the passage of a monetary system from one position of equilibrium to another", Keynes 1930; C.W., V, 1971: xvii.
His "fundamental equations" (Book III, C.W., V, 1971) were concerned with the determinants and forms of sectorial price levels -those of available and non-available goods -as well as with the overall level. Keynes argued that both short-period and long-period versions were consistent with the quantity theory. It was Richard Kahn who argued that they could also be interpreted and applied without any mention of the quantity theory (of which he had been 12 Milton Friedman: We're talking about the political world, the political market as opposed to the economic one. But in interpreting the political market, George very consistently, interprets the political market as a resolution of opposing self-interests and tended to give very little attention to the extent to which it arose, out of the desire of the people involved in government, to promote the public interest. That is, I think a fair statement and he took that position to a greater extent than most other people… Keynes now was the believer in the public interest theory. John Maynard Keynes was a strong believer in the public interest theory of regulation, and in the operation of government. Indeed I think it was his legacy on that subject which was much more damaging than his legacy on economics (Conversation between Craig Freedman and Milton Friedman, Rose Friedman, Aaron Director, August 1997).
sceptical since his days as a school boy). These later became the basis of a distinction between cost-push and demand-pull inflation, (see Harcourt 1994; 1995: 48) .
Keynes used an idiosyncratic definition of saving -"The differences between the money incomes of individuals and their money expenditure on current consumption" (Keynes 1930 (Keynes , C.W., V, 1971 . Pure profits (or losses) were defined as windfalls and not included in incomes (112-13). Consequently, when the value of saving so defined departed from the value of investment, prices tended to change in a manner akin to Wicksell's cumulative process. As the volumes were concerned with the monetary theory of price formation and policy so derived, Keynes tried to abide by a self-imposed ordinance that only price levels and their movements be analysed in detail. He did admit to Ralph Hawtrey that he had not always been true to himself, but had he pushed his analysis further he would have strayed into the complex, detailed and out of place analysis of short-period changes in output and employment (C.W., XIII, 1973: 145-6 ). Subsequently, though, he wrote to Joan Robinson that she and the 'circus' members had been rather hard on him for provisionally assuming that output and employment were given at one point of his argument (C.W., XIII: 270). Nevertheless, his procedure was to follow the determination of succeeding short-period stations on their way to the long-period cross, a thoroughly Marshallian procedure 13 .
In his analysis, Keynes used the concept of a natural rate of interest as an anchoring device with which he could chart the economic consequence of a deviation of the nominal rate of interest from this position. The natural rate ruled the roost by reconciling the forces of productivity and thrift. Only policy could pull the nominal rate back to equality with the natural one. Much of Keynes's analysis, as he acknowledged, followed from the lead devised The structure of A Treatise on Money still maintained a dichotomy separating the real from the monetary. The volume recognized the implications of any differences between saving and investment for the working of the economy, but these were not yet fully worked out. As far as the impact of policy on the economy was concerned, the emphasis was on the effect that the long-term rate of interest had on investment in long-lived productive assets Harcourt and Kerr (2009) . 15 As a skilled polemicist, Keynes was more interested in scoring the points needed to carry his argument than in hewing to the detailed accuracy required of the intellectual historian.
As a historian of thought in areas in which he was emotionally involved as a protagonist and prophet, Keynes seemed to me to be seriously lacking in the unexciting but essential qualities for the intellectual historian of objectivity and of judiciousness. Even when he was engaged in selecting those upon whom to bestow laurels for having in some degree anticipated his discoveries, his selection seemed to me then, and still seems to me now that I have acquired more knowledge of the older literature, often to have been random when not eccentric (Viner 2003:418 This has to measure up to the nominal rate of interest. (In the old story, the direction was reversed.) Fifthly, the rate of interest is primarily a monetary phenomenon 17 , as it is closely related to the workings of the money market. It was not a price that equilibrated saving and investment, but, rather, the price which equated the supply and demand for money. Sixthly, the general price level is determined by the prices of the variable factors and their short-period productivities, not by M and V, meaning that its value is determined in the real sector.
(Qualitatively inessential modifications would be made for imperfectly competitive market structures, should, or when, they might occur.) Seventhly, and perhaps the most fundamental factor behind all the arguments establishing the principal characteristics of the system, is the overwhelming importance of expectations, especially long-term expectations. Most important here were their determination and the impact they had on all important economic decisions and relationships in the environment of fundamental, inescapable uncertainly.
Friedman's Response
Friedman emphatically rejected each of these points. As a necessary step in undermining Keynes and his influence on the profession, Friedman categorically denied the concept of uncertainty as exerting any significant influence on economic outcomes. In doing so, he explicitly discarded one of the key insights developed by his erstwhile teacher, Frank Knight (uncertainty as uninsurable risk). Allowing uncertainty into the mix might logically undermine his own firmly held belief in individual rationality and responsibility.
Milton Friedman: But I think his distinction between risk and uncertainty is untenable…. I believe that it uses a false theory of probability. I believe that the only theory of probability that can hold water is personal probability, the kind of thing that Jimmy Savage help develop 18 . If 16 For a clear statement of the importance of this for Keynes, see Meade1975: 82. 17 Not completely, since the transactions and precautionary demands for money are related to prices and quantities. 18 The attempt to substitute subjective probability for uncertainty came at an early stage of the Chicago counterrevolution. The relevant paper produced by Friedman and Savage (1948) is "Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk". Clearly Friedman's need to disarm and impede any development and employment of uncertainty in economic analysis is striking importance. It may also, at some level, have signalled his initial you take that approach, you can't distinguish uncertainty from risk. There's no break point. But also, you see, it means that Knight implicitly was working on a definition of probability as a relative frequency. And that misleads people into thinking that there are objective probabilities that you can know. Therefore it leads to a distinction between risk and uncertainty in terms of costs. Knight assumes you know some probabilities and that there's no way you can know others. In a personal probability sense, nobody really knows any probability. attempt to make a clear break from the views associated with Knight. However at the time, most American Keynesians left this notion of uncertainty largely unexplored. 19 For Friedman, Keynes had offered nothing superior to the policies already touted by his teachers at Chicago. Theoretically, he would have preferred the ideological implications of the theoretical approach provided by Knight and Simons to the interventionist implications of Keynes's framework On the contrary, so far as policy was concerned, Keynes had nothing to offer to those of us who had sat at the feet of Simons, Mints, Knight and Viner (Friedman 1972:837) . 20 The editor of the Canadian Journal of Economics, in which Knight's scathing review originally appeared, offered Keynes a right of reply. … Keynes declined, saying that 'with Professor Knight's two main conclusions, namely, that my book caused him intense irritation, and that he had had great difficulty in understanding it, I am in agreement. So perhaps you will excuse me if I leave the article alone' (Patinkin 2003d:384 First he revived the study of monetary economics, which had become moribund. He used the quantity theory of money, and refurbished and extended it, not only to study economic behaviour but also to launch a powerful attack on the Keynesian School (Stigler 1988:150-151 ).
Friedman's first monetary broadside came with the publication in 1956 of The Quantity
Theory -A Restatement. Remember that the strategy was not simply to offer an alternative, but to present it as going back to the roots of the economics profession. Thus his revived version of the quantity theory became something of a cleansing, or purification, driving out the false spirits infecting the profession. He did this by tying his approach to that of an oral tradition which he claimed to have imbibed during his stay in the Chicago of the 1930s.
The purpose of this introduction is not to enshrine -or, should I say, inter -a definitive version of the Chicago tradition. To suppose that one could do so would be inconsistent with that tradition itself. The purpose is rather to set down a particular 'model' of a quantity theory in an attempt to convey the flavour of the oral tradition which nurtured the remaining essays in this volume (Friedman 1956: 3 There is one respect -and I believe only one -in which the discussion of the demand curve for money in the General Theory is distinctively Keynesian and that is the importance attached to 'absolute liquidity preference' or a high-interest elasticity of the demand for money. This element is distinctively Keynesian in the double sense that it is, so far as I know, introduced for the first time in the General Theory (Friedman 1972:157) .
In fact Keynes mentioned his notorious liquidity trap only in passing as a theoretical possibility 23 . Given that such a situation had never arisen, Keynes proceeded to move on to 22 After what might be considered to be a good deal of unnecessary to-ing and fro-ing, Friedman conceded Patinkin's historical claim, but remained adamant as to his reading of Keynes. However, even his admission seems niggling as he ingeniously claimed that too much had been made of what was no more than an aside. This extenuation remains curious, as he spent his three opening paragraphs of that influential essay underlining the connection between his reformulation and this older, oral tradition. I find your description of the oral tradition entirely acceptable and much better and more acceptable than mine. In extenuation, I can only say that the 1956 essay did not set out to be an essay in the history of thought but an introduction to a collection of studies (Friedman quoted in Leeson 2003b:257) . 23 To be exact, it would only occur in the case of very low interest rates, a theoretical possibility to which Keynes did not attach a great deal of likelihood. (Keynes 1936: 207) more pressing matters. Instead he presumed that the underlying transaction costs of bringing together borrower and lender would preclude interest rates from reaching such low requisite levels. For Keynes this potential, rather than probable condition remained more of a curiosity, than posing any practical danger. Friedman, however, by reinterpreting this theoretical possibility, managed to transform it into a, if not the, major theme of The General Theory.
Whether or not his arguments, in this regard, were convincing is another matter. However, it was clearly important that his own work should be construed as untouched by any Keynesian influence if he was to successfully dismiss the importance of John Maynard Keynes. An important result of Friedman's analysis was to negate any possible impact of fiscal policy on employment or output by effectively "emasculating" the multiplier. The introduction to his … a long-term rate of interest of (say) 2 per cent, leaves more to fear than to hope, and offers, at the same time, a running yield which is only sufficient to offset a very small measure of fear (Keynes 1936:202) . 24 For an overall assessment of his characteristics, see Erik Lundberg's comments when Friedman received the Nobel Prize in 1976 , Lindberg (1976 .
work on the consumption function leaves little doubt that such an explicit motivation is driving his analysis:
"The doubts about the adequacy of the Keynesian consumption function raised by the empirical evidence were reinforced by the theoretical controversy about Keynes's proposition that there is no automatic force in a monetary economy to assure the existence of a full-employment equilibrium position. A number of writers, particularly Haberler and Pigou, demonstrated that this analytical proposition is invalid if consumption expenditure is taken to be a function not only of income but also of wealth or, to put it differently, if the average propensity to consume is taken to depend in a particular way on the ratio of wealth to income" (Friedman 1957: 5) .
In order to achieve this objective, Friedman subtly changed the definition of consumption from that utilised by Keynes. As Keynes was primarily interested in consumption as a component of aggregate demand, he focused on: "Expenditure on consumption during any period [which] must mean the value of the goods sold to consumers during that period" (Keynes 1936: 61) . For Keynes this distinction between consumption expenditure and investment expenditure was determined by the source of that expenditure between consumers and entrepreneurs (Keynes 1936: 61) . Friedman, by contrast, utilised a much narrower definition of consumption, explicitly ruling out the purchase of durable goods and instead confining it to non-durables and the value of the services derived from such durables (Friedman 1957: 28) . For Friedman, "expenditures on durable consumer goods can be regarded as capital expenditures and only the imputed value of services rendered included as consumption" (Friedman 1957 p. 20) .
Building on Irving Fisher's understanding of individuals' consumption and saving behaviour over their lifetimes, Friedman defined two concepts which underlay observed time-series and cross-section data on consumption and income, but which did not directly coincide with them, i.e., were not immediately observable. The observed statistics, Friedman argued, were made up of two elements: temporary consumption and income and permanent consumption and income. The real determinant of life-time consumption behaviour was permanent income. The temporary components were only relevant in so far as over time they affected the values of permanent income. Similarly, temporary consumption needed to be distinguished as the disposal of windfall gains or losses mainly. Such decisions affected current saving rather than sustained behaviour in regard to the consumption of the services of consumption goods, especially those of consumer durables. This entailed a sharp distinction between expenditure -actual purchases and when they occurred -and true consumption, which was the use per unit of time of services provided over the lifetimes of consumer goods. As a result it suppressed the timing and amount of expenditure which would be more relevant as far as the creation of employment and output were concerned.
Moreover, since any stable 'true' relationship in the theory of consumer behaviour related to the links between permanent income and permanent consumption, any relationship observed between total consumption and total income was a spurious, non-meaningful, not to be relied upon, finding.
This had important implications for Keynes's version of the consumption function, which, in
The General Theory, Keynes argued to be a stable short-run relationship. Keynes used this connection to derive the multiplier. By doing so he assumed that its characteristics could be relied upon when designing fiscal policy. The implications of Friedman's analysis were to pull the rug out from under these claims by Keynes and those who followed him. If there was neither a meaningful nor a stable relationship between observed consumption expenditure and income, both at the individual and aggregate level, Keynes's policy proposals, including those involving the multiplier, were argued to be invalid. In place of Keynes's consumption/income relation Friedman restored the rate of interest as the major determinant of consumption/saving, thereby resurrecting loanable funds as the main explanation of saving and investment. In doing so, he removed what Keynes saw as one of the central propositions of The General Theory, namely, that it is changes in income which equate saving and investment, not the rate of interest.
When Keynes wrote
The General Theory, the significance of durable goods expenditure on total household consumption was much less than would be the case in the post-war period.
Nor was the availability of "credit for all" then a leading characteristic of capitalist institutions. Both of these factors would surely have modified Keynes's views on the consumption function and, of course, did in the writings by Keynes's followers in the postwar period (not least by Harcourt, Karmel and Wallace in Economic Activity (1967) ). Nor was Keynes unaware of the factors and propositions that Friedman put forward in his 1957 booka careful reading of the chapters on the consumption function in The General Theory will discover references to all the ingredients of Friedman's theory, together with the argument that in the short run their impact is likely to be minor. If such relationships hold, then current "Since, therefore, the main background of subjective and social incentives changes slowly, whilst the short-period influence of changes in the rate of interest and the other objective factors is often of secondary importance, we are left with the conclusion that short-period changes in consumption largely depend on changes in the rate at which income …. is being earned and not on changes in the propensity to consume out of a given income" (Keynes 1936: 110). Nevertheless, despite Friedman's sustained efforts to discredit Keynes's approach and policies based on it, when Jim Thomas surveyed the econometric work of various theories and specifications of the consumption function (Thomas 1997 ), Keynes's short-period consumption function performed well when compared to all other approaches, (see Riach 1997: vol 1, xxvi, and Thomas, 1997: 158-60) . 
On International Trade
While it was the USA through Harry Dexter White rather than the UK through Keynes who overwhelmingly carried the day in setting up the characteristic dimensions of the Bretton Woods institutions, Keynes supported a regime of fixed exchange rates with the possibility of moveable pegs for economies whose external balance was seriously ruptured. (The object was to preserve internal balance.) He was also in favour of permanent capital controls in order to protect exchange rates from the impact of hot money inflows and outflows. This was because of the problems associated with the instability of a flexible exchange rate regime, as Keynes had warned about the dangers of speculation and the impact of the uncertainty it generates on the economic environment.
None of these provisions were acceptable to Friedman who, from at least the 1950s on advocated establishing a system of floating exchange rates to tackle deficiencies in the processes at work in the international economy. Asimakopulos (1982) worked out the precise conditions which had to hold for this to be a coherent procedure. 28 It can be argued that employing free competition in The General Theory was basically a tactical move to prevent critics from shifting the terms of debate. The problems Keynes sketched were meant to apply to all market economies (it was, after all, a general theory) rather than restricted to one particular variety. The danger was that too much of the subsequent debate might have centred on whether or not markets were competitive, and not on problems inherent to any such market economies. 29 Starting with Knight, Chicago saw nothing to be gained by following the thirties craze for imperfect and monopolistic competition. Friedman 1976b: 282. advocacy was that there existed a pattern of stable, long-run, equilibrium exchange rates.
Markets characterised by the free floats and deregulation would quickly find and hold these equilibrium rates, aided and abetted by the systemically beneficial actions and effects of speculators. So, yet again, there was a significant part of Keynes's system and policy recommendation to which Friedman was opposed, in this case, in practice, successfully so.
Conclusion
This paper has looked at Keynes's analysis and Friedman's response to it, and has suggested an interpretation different from the conventional wisdom of the profession on Friedman's role in undermining Keynes's message in The General Theory.
Friedman's vision was one where markets worked efficiently, and prices operated so as to ensure that all markets clear. Monetary variables did not influence real ones, and instead influenced only the inflation rate. Governments could not increase employment, which was already stood at full employment. They were limited to at best inducing a temporary trade-off with increased inflation being the long-run price of any attempt to reduce unemployment.
There was no "fundamental" uncertainty, in the Keynesian sense -only probable outcomes.
Speculators profited by correctly predicting the natural outcomes, and acted so as to facilitate and speed up market adjustment. Friedman believed in the self-correcting powers of markets, and thought that this would only be impeded by government intervention. By in fact eliminating dangers flowing from any sustained economic power, such meddling became substantially pointless. Government planning would instead only serve to limit individual freedom and liberty.
Although in his work before The General Theory, Keynes also accepted the long-run equilibrating powers of markets, after The General Theory, Keynes's view of the economy was quite different. He saw decision making and subsequent actions as permeated by fundamental uncertainty. Keynes could no longer believe that market forces would guarantee the full utilisation of all resources, especially not labour. Such a conclusion made the need for government intervention necessary and indeed inevitable.
In section 3 we identified seven main points of distinction between Keynes' This chapter has documented Friedman's deliberate attempt at dismantling the Keynesian legacy, and highlighted his underlying theme which was to re-establish the primacy of markets and the impotence of government intervention.
The post-war period saw the successful implementation of Keynesian policies at the domestic level. This period, often called the "golden-age of capitalism", came to an end in the early 1970s, at the same time that Friedman's ideas came to dominate both the economics profession and economic policy. As a result of Friedman's writings, Governments became committed to the idea of monetary targets, and many OECD countries tried to implement these. However, as fixed money supply targets proved impossible to implement, mainly due to the endogenous nature of the money supply, they were eventually abandoned. In economic theory, Friedman's views were taken to an extreme that Friedman himself rejected, by the rational expectations school -which applied his analysis of rational maximising individuals to the arena of expectations. The resultant theory assumed that the economy is always in equilibrium and that government could have no impact on the economy. It also abolished the distinction between short run and long run, as rational economic agents immediately adjusted to any shock. Subsequently a new consensus arose, especially with regard to monetary policy,
